

SECRET

LONG RANGE PLAN

DD/I

SEPTEMBER 1965



GROUP No. 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

DIA review(s) completed.

W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

DIA review(s) completed.



Vol. 2

(one copy)

CONTENTS

Office of National Estimates

Office of Current Intelligence

Office of Research and Reports

Office of Basic Intelligence

Office of Central Reference


S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

FOREWORD

We anticipate that the Office of National Estimates will continue to produce, during the period of the long-range plan, between 50 and 100 estimates each year for consideration by the United States Intelligence Board in response to the continuing needs and demands of US policy-makers. The number will vary depending on the gravity and criticality of international occurrences and their relationship to US security interests. In addition, we anticipate that the Office will produce about 150 memoranda each year in various art forms, including Memoranda for the DCI and Memoranda for the USIB. The subject matter of a number of these memoranda will be of the sort that once would have been handled in an SNIE. The estimates and memoranda will continue to focus on developing problems and situations throughout the world of particular interest and importance to US policy-makers. Specifically, we expect that the number and complexity of estimates on Communist China, particularly military and scientific/technical questions, will continue to increase. We also foresee a continuation and expansion of our effort on the already formidable Intelligence Assumptions for Planning to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense and his Department. There will be a requirement to produce this kind of detailed intelligence on the Chinese Communist, Asian Satellite and European Satellite Armed Forces as we now regularly do on the Soviet Armed Forces. Over-all we feel fairly sanguine that we could respond to the need for timely assessments of critical areas and problems by increasing our professional staff complement by five positions over the next few years.

S-E-C-R-E-T



ASSUMPTIONS

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Assumptions


Substantive

1. The following proposals for Assumptions to go with an Intelligence plan proceed from a rather narrow and doctrinaire construction of the problem. Consequently, even if they satisfy the requirement for Assumptions, they probably will not satisfy the requirement for substantive advice from the Board concerning the scope of the Plan. Anyway, here is the doctrine:

2. All Assumptions, or almost all, are Estimates, but they are Estimates which someone has decided to accept as bases for a Plan. As far as the Plan is concerned, they become the equivalent of hard facts; if they turn out not to be facts the Plan miscarries and perhaps disaster ensues. (Sometimes one has an alternative Plan, based on different Assumptions). Consequently, the formulation of Assumptions for an important Plan is not a matter to be lightly undertaken. Not all Estimates, not even all confident ones, can safely be admitted as Assumptions.

3. To be sure, financial or other exigencies sometimes bear so hard that a Plan has to be narrowed in scope by assuming, despite the dictates of prudence, that certain problems do not exist. I take it that we are not yet so constrained. Nevertheless, the Intelligence Plan will rest in large part on various fiscal and administrative assumptions which are none of our business; e.g., that US Government appropriations for Intelligence will be of such-and-such dimensions; that covert operations are a part of Intelligence, that the necessary personnel and skills will be available, etc. But to get to our share of the work, which, at least at this stage, permits us a lofty disregard of budgetary considerations:

S-E-C-R-E-T



S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

4. We could play safe -- very safe indeed -- with one Assumption only: "All occurrences in the world or outer space, and all ideas whether expressed or unexpressed, represent potential threats to US security." Or we could be foolish in another way by assuming that: "the only threats to US security arise from Communist activity." Common sense rejects these and many other conceivable assumptions.

5. Once you get to experimenting with the formulation of Assumptions, especially with those designed to govern a great broad Intelligence Plan for the US, it turns out that the valid formulations are pretty dismal clichés. Yet this is not necessarily anything against them. They may be true, even if they bore the reader. Moreover, to test the usefulness of an Assumption it is sometimes helpful to consider the implications of its negative. For example: "Nuclear war will remain a possibility during the period covered by this Plan"; this is a cliché. But consider the implications for an Intelligence Plan of the opposite assumptions: "Nuclear war will not be a possibility during the period" (I do not wish to contend, however, that any statement becomes an appropriate Assumption simply because its negative would have preposterous implications; we do not need to assume that "Mankind will continue to exist during the period of this Plan.")

6. The following list of Assumptions has been formulated on the principle in paragraph 2 above, plus two more: (a) Assumptions should be as few as possible, and (b) for a broad and general Intelligence Plan, the Assumptions will perforce be broad and general. Accordingly, here they are, with comments:

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

A. The principal antagonists of the US will be the USSR and Communist China.

Comment: I see no need, in Assumptions, to distinguish between the two, or to set forth the modes, methods, weapons, etc. with which these countries will pursue their antagonism. These are all subjects for Intelligence to work out, under the Plan; not to assume. But, if we had to cut down on the US intelligence effort, one way to do so would be to assume, for instance, that "the main threats to US security will arise from China" and that "the threat from the USSR will be less significant than that from China."

B. Other Communist countries will be generally hostile to the US, and aligned, with varying degrees of firmness, either to the USSR or to Communist China.

Comment: Perhaps we should say "Most other Communist countries. . . ." Yet the statement, without the "Most," illustrates a formulation which, though not a very good Estimate, is probably a good Assumption for an Intelligence Plan.

C. The nations of Western Europe, plus Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, will remain basically friendly to the US in the major confrontation with Communist states, though there will be occasional conflicts of interest between them and the US.

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Comment: This is almost the only Assumption I have been able to formulate which cuts down, to some degree, the otherwise vast scope of Intelligence activity that seems to be required.

D. Most other countries of the world -- especially the "underdeveloped" countries -- will be unstable to varying degrees in their domestic affairs and their international alignments. The attitudes and actions of even the weakest of these states may, according to circumstance, be of importance to US security.

Comment: Surely a good example of a broad Assumption. It could be narrowed, but just how? (Note, however, that if the broad Intelligence Plan is broken down into several area or regional plans, each of these plans might have Assumptions which would usefully narrow its scope.) I would reject all Assumptions about the modes of instability, or the reasons for it, or the importance of economic development, population growth, etc. These are aspects of Intelligence itself, not Assumptions on which a broad Intelligence Plan should be based. But you could have an Assumption somewhat as follows: "The policies of most countries, and especially of underdeveloped countries, will depend to a significant degree on the rate of social and economic advance in those countries, and on the relation of that rate to popular expectations."

E. Nuclear war, involving the US, will remain a possibility during the period of this Plan.

- 4 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Comment: I really think that this is an unnecessary Assumption -- it is subsumed under A, as explained in the comment on A. But I suppose we have to have it. There is no need to specify whether nuclear war is general or limited. Once you've got this Assumption, however, you have to add the next:

F. Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, wars of national liberation, and armed rebellions will occur from time to time in various areas. Most of these conflicts will involve US interests to some degree; some of them will threaten US security interests, some will involve US armed forces.

7. Those are all the Assumptions I would recommend. There could be plenty of others, many of which I would regard as unnecessary. For example, there is no need to assume the absence of general disarmament; or the absence of world economic depression, etc. I do not think it necessary to mention communism as an ideology, or Vietnam. There are also obvious Assumptions about US policy and objectives, but these are prudently left unformulated. And so on.

8. But I am aware, as stated at the beginning, that the Assumptions I have listed do precious little to restrict the scope of intelligence planning. We could go further in this respect. The best way to do so would be to select certain areas, countries, or subjects which, by Assumption, could be ignored in an Intelligence Plan. This is dubious business, unless we are forced by financial or intellectual stringencies to rule certain interesting intelligence problems out of the account altogether.

- 5 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

9. Finally, concerning priorities. To some degree the Assumptions formulated above imply orders of priority -- A versus B, for example, and C versus all the rest. Yet these are very general. The further elaboration of priorities is certainly an important aspect of an Intelligence Plan -- it could be in the Plan itself, or the Plan could provide for PNIO's, perish the thought, and so on, in even greater detail. Perhaps the core problem for the Board to consider, in connection with this Assumptions exercise, is whether more could be done in the Assumptions to delimit and restrict the area of intelligence activity which must be planned for. I fear that if we do not do it in the Assumptions we shall have to do it in another paper. But I find it very difficult to do in Assumptions, unless there be a very long and detailed list, and such a long list is bad in principle.

- 6 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Assumptions

Non-Substantive

1. During the past few years we have had to devote an increasing amount of time and effort to intra- and inter-agency committees, task forces, and ad hoc groups. We expect this trend to continue, with our people being required to attend more meetings and prepare more written contributions and critiques on the subjects under discussion.

2. We expect that we will have to devote more time and attention to contacts in those components attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense who are the primary consumers of our military/technical estimates. In this connection we anticipate that the present Intelligence Assumptions for Planning on the Soviet Armed Forces will be expanded to include the Armed Forces of Communist China, the Asian Satellites, and the European Satellites. We also expect that these planning documents will be extended both in substantive content and the time period under consideration.

3. We believe that much of the information required to make reliable estimative judgments can best be obtained by frequent travel to the field for discussions and on-the-scene observations. We would advocate, therefore, that more travel money be made available for this purpose. We also believe that periodic, two-to three-month tours should be arranged for our people in their geographic areas of responsibility.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

OBJECTIVES

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Objectives

Substantive

1. Soviet military policy and developments and trends within the major force components, the scope and direction of research and development, the space program, the atomic energy program, BW and CW capabilities, and other technical developments with implications for US security.
2. Major developments in Soviet foreign policy, especially in regard to policies and attitudes affecting US interests. Soviet attitudes and involvement in crisis situations throughout the world. Soviet relations with Communist China, the Eastern European states, and the world Communist movement in general. Internal Soviet political developments, and trends in the Soviet economy.
3. The capabilities and intentions of Chinese Communist military forces, with particular reference to their development of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, and other sophisticated weapons systems.
4. Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions to initiate or support insurgency or subversion in other countries.
5. Political, economic, scientific, and technical developments in Communist China.
6. Soviet and Chinese Communist policies and intentions with respect to the war in Vietnam.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

7. Political development and trends in the countries of Southeast Asia, and their susceptibility to Communist subversion.

8. Political, economic, and military developments in Cuba, and Cuban relations with Communist countries.

9. Non-Bloc research, development, and production of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and other advanced weapons systems.

10. The vulnerabilities of particular Latin American countries to Communist subversion.

11. The stability and orientation of the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, the dangers of war between these countries, and Communist subversion.

12. The stability and orientation of the countries of Africa, their relations with one another and with the major powers, and their vulnerability to communism.

25X6

25X6

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Objectives

Non-Substantive

1. We anticipate a requirement for a classified conference telephone which would permit us to hold substantive discussions on national intelligence estimates simultaneously with USIB members and their representatives. DC

2. In the interests of speed and security during crisis situations, we see a need for a classified communications system which would permit us to cable the text of national intelligence estimates to appropriate US policy-makers.


S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

DDI/NE
A-3
I. USSR
E. Estimates

Long-Term Program

To estimate trends in the Soviet economy, internal politics, and foreign policy, attitudes and actions toward crisis situations, and relations with Communist and non-Communist states.

Program Cost			Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	We expect no ^{is it} diminution in requests for regularly scheduled NIEs and papers on the USSR and some increase in NIEs dealing with the Soviet economy and internal Soviet politics. We also anticipate an increase in requests for SNIEs and special papers on crisis situations involving the USSR (e.g., as in Vietnam).	
1966				
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1975	Level Off			
1980	Level Off			

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

DDI/NE

A-3

I. Soviet Military
E. Estimates

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

To estimate Soviet military policy and developments and trends within the major force components, the scope and direction of research and development, the space program, the atomic energy program, BW and CW capabilities, and other technical developments with implications for US security.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
<u>Year</u>	A	B	
1966		We expect an increasing number of requests for estimates on Soviet military, scientific, and technical capabilities.	Staff may require one or two more analysts in time.
1967		We also expect additional requests from the Department of Defense for detailed, planning documents.	
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

DDI/NE
A-3

I. European Satellites
E. Estimates

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

To estimate political, economic, and military trends in the individual East European Communist states, their foreign policies (especially toward each other and the USSR), and their drive for independence.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966	<div></div>	We expect an increasing number of requests for estimates on Eastern Europe as more interesting and important developments occur.	Staff may require one additional analyst.
1967		We expect a requirement from the Department of Defense for an Intelligence Assumptions for Planning document on the European Satellites.	
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		
Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.			

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

DDI/NE

A-3

I. Communist China-North Korea
E. Estimates

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

To estimate political, economic, scientific and technical developments and trends in Communist China and North Korea, their capabilities and intentions to initiate or support insurgency or subversion in other countries, their relationship with Moscow, and their capacity to support a major war.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966		We expect an increasing number of requests for estimative papers on Communist China. We see no respite on this account; even if the Vietnam war ends, new flare-ups are likely elsewhere on China's periphery. A US-China military confrontation is also possible during the 15-year period.	1. An increase of at least one analyst in the Far East staff.
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

DDI/NE
A-3
I. Chinese Communist Military
E. Estimates

Long-Term Program

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of Chinese Communist military

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966			1. At least two additional analysts. In addition to their primary responsibilities on China, these analysts would provide support on technical/military problems arising elsewhere in the Far East.
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T


S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

DDI/NE
 A-3
 I. Vietnam
 E. Estimates

Long-Term Program

To estimate Communist policies and military actions, capabilities, and intentions with respect to the war in Vietnam.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966			1. At least one additional analyst is required almost immediately.
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

DDI/NE
A-3
I. Cuba
E. Estimates

Long-Term Program

To estimate:

1. political, ideological, economic and sociological developments, trends and prospects in Cuba;
2. Cuba's foreign policies and intentions, particularly regarding the US, Latin America and the other Communist nations; and
3. Castro's position in the International Communist movement and his relationship with the Cuban Communists.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966		During the next five years, and more especially over the following decade, the leadership and orientation of the Cuban Government probably will be substantially altered. Until this occurs, and in the absence of other unforeseeable dramatic developments, we anticipate a decrease in the demand for estimative intelligence on Cuba.	Hopefully, at least some of the attention now being devoted to Cuban matters can be shifted to other potential troublespots in Latin America.
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

DDI/NE
A-3
V. Far East
E. Estimates

Long-Term Program

To estimate major political trends in the countries of the area and their susceptibility to Communist subversion; the stability of Malaysia; Indonesian military capabilities and intentions; []

25X6

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966	[]	1. Requirements will probably expand somewhat, especially as []	25X1A
1967		Taiwan and South Korea grow restive, Okinawan reversion problems increase, Indonesia drifts toward the Bloc, and Southeast Asia/Pacific area problems persist and multiply under Chicom pressures.	25X6
1968		2. Depending on events in Vietnam, other "Vietnams" may ultimately develop in Asia.	
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

DDI/NE

A-3

IV. Near East-South Asia
E. Estimates

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

To estimate the stability and orientation of the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, the dangers of war between countries in the region, their prospects for economic progress, and the development of Communist strength in the area.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966		There will be a growing emphasis on the need for scientific intelligence;	1. Possibly more support from OSI. 2. More frequent travel to and occasional tours in area.
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

DDI/NE
A-3
III. Africa
E. Estimates

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

To estimate the stability and orientation of the countries of Africa, their prospects for economic progress, and the extent and nature of Communist subversion, particularly as applied to insurgent liberation movements.

Program Cost			Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B		
1966				1. The increase of one analyst, perhaps two, in the African staff. 2. More frequent travel to area.
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1975	Level Off		ble. Also, it is almost certain that political and social turmoil will prevail throughout much of this area for many years to come. In these circumstances, we expect a growing increase in the number of NIEs requested during the next 3 to 5 years. It is possible that racial warfare, complicated by increased Communist subversion may break out somewhere in southern Africa over the next 5-15 years.	
1980	Level Off			

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

DDI/NE
A-3
VI. Latin America
E. Estimates

To estimate:

1. political, economic, intellectual and sociological trends in the Latin American area;
2. official and public reaction to US policies;
3. the foreign policies and foreign policy intentions of the Latin American nations;
4. the prospects for and the consequences of Communist or other extremist activities;
5. the prospects for regional organizations such as the OAS, the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACOM); and
6. the progress and results of the Alliance for Progress.

Program Cost		Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	
1966			During the next five years, and the subsequent decade, the Latin American area will be undergoing significant economic and political changes. There will be a wide variation in the rate and extent of such change but every country will be affected, particularly in the 1970-1980 period. New groups will probably be contesting for power and the present leadership will probably change in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and other countries. We believe that Latin American nationalism will continue to increase with consequent implications for US-Latin American relations. We anticipate an increase in requirements for intelligence and estimative support in LA matters.
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		1. Increased need for intelligence collection, research and analyses on Latin American economics, political power structures and nationalism. 2. More frequent travel to and occasional tours in area.
1980	Level Off		

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

DDI/NE
A-5
System-wide Support

To provide the necessary administrative, managerial, and clerical support to carry out the over-all mission and functions of the Office.

Program Cost			Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	F	
1966	<div></div>			1. We anticipate a requirement for a classified conference telephone which would permit us to hold substantive discussions on national intelligence estimates simultaneously with USIB members and their representatives. 2. In the interests of speed and security during crisis situations, we see a need for a classified communications system which would permit us to cable the text of national intelligence estimates to appropriate US policy-makers.
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1975	Level Off			
1980	Level Off			

Comment: Calculated at 5% increase per position per year.

S-E-C-R-E-T


OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Long-Term Program

DDI/NE
A-5

II. Training and Travel

To provide foreign and domestic travel for purposes of orientation and essential discussions and consultation in support of the production program of the Office; to continue to permit at least two analysts each year to attend institutions of higher learning as part of their over-all career development program.

	Program Cost	Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
<u>Year</u>	A	Information essential for estimative judgments can often best be obtained through discussions and on-the-scene observations in the field. Frequent travel should also have a salutary effect on the quality and timeliness of field reporting.	
1966		We plan to continue to assign analysts who have demonstrated competence and shown promise of assuming greater responsibility to academic institutions for a year of post-graduate study.	
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1975	Level Off		
1980	Level Off		

* The travel portion of this figure represents a major and arbitrary cut in an attempt to meet the FY 66 Congressional budget. It is not a realistic figure.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Recommendations

Over and above the specific recommendations made under the foregoing headings, we recommend that the Agency make a concerted effort to ensure that key participants in the estimative process are kept informed of policy considerations and activities in the policy-making circles of the US Government. What is going on and what is likely to happen in foreign areas very often depends primarily on what the US Government is saying to foreign leaders, doing in their areas, and planning to do there. The full potential for national intelligence support of US policy decisions will not be realized unless we are aware of the policy deliberations and plans of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the White House Staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

FIFTEEN YEAR INTELLIGENCE PLAN (1966-80)

FOREWORD

23 July 1965

We anticipate no significant change during the coming years in our existing mission and functions, which reflect directly the requirements of the DDI, DCI, USIB, NSC and the White House. We do, however, envisage a steady increase in the number, variety and complexity of special requests from the recipients of our products at these levels of government. Moreover, we expect to be asked to provide increasingly more intelligence support to the legislative branch. There will be mounting pressure to speed up delivery of our products to all recipients. Improved rapid and secure communications with overseas elements will also be required. } oc

Analysis and reporting of world developments on a current basis will, as in the past, require great flexibility in the use of personnel and facilities to provide complete and timely coverage of crisis developments and at the same time to keep abreast of other important situations.

In the next fifteen years we must anticipate significant changes in the world order, even though we cannot now delineate them specifically. Such changes will have a profound impact on current intelligence priorities and production demands. The principal menace, the USSR, will continue to be formidable, in a military sense at least. But the threat posed by Communist China will mount rapidly and Chinese actions will have to be monitored as intensively, if not more so, than those of the USSR.

In this connection we anticipate that, although the war in Vietnam may be ended militarily or politically within the next five years, Southeast Asia will continue to be unsettled and there the requirements for current intelligence will remain high. There are good indications that South Asia may become a new crisis area [redacted]

Domestic developments and the foreign relations of the African and Latin American countries will take on increasing significance for US policy and hence the current intelligence effort in those areas will have to be expanded. Although we expect [redacted] Free World powers to remain essentially friendly to the US, there will be policy differences between them and the US and among themselves which will continue to require close watch.

SECRET

SECRET

The space age and the era of intercontinental missiles and nuclear energy are in their infancy and enormous advances are certain to take place in these fields in the coming years. It will be increasingly important to keep the top echelons of the government informed of developments in these functional fields as they are detected.

In sum, the prospect for the foreseeable future in foreign affairs is for a constantly growing need for accurate and rapid reporting of events throughout the world. Although it is impossible to identify and to prepare for the specific developments in foreign affairs in the years ahead, we can discern some of the trends. They are reflected in the "Assumptions" which follow.

SECRET

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

FIFTEEN YEAR INTELLIGENCE PLAN (1966-80)

I. ASSUMPTIONS


23 July 1965

NOTE: Our Assumptions are a slight expansion of those prepared by the Office of National Estimates

1. Substantive

A. The principal antagonists of the US will be the USSR and Communist China, with the main threat to US security shifting from the USSR to China during the next five years.

B. Other Communist countries will be generally hostile to the US and may become involved in military operations against the US or its allies. They will be aligned in varying degrees of firmness, either with the USSR or with Communist China. In Eastern Europe the trends toward nationalism and independence of Moscow will continue.



25X6

D. Most other countries of the world--especially the underdeveloped countries with increasing economic problems--will be unstable to varying degrees in their domestic affairs and their international alignments. The attitudes and actions of even the weakest of these states may, according to circumstances, be of importance to US security.

SECRET

SECRET

D. Nuclear war involving the US will remain a possibility during the period of this plan.

F. Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, Communist-inspired guerrilla insurrections, and armed rebellions will occur from time to time in various areas. Most of these conflicts will involve US interests to some degree; some of them will threaten US security interests, and some will involve US armed forces. As one critical situation is resolved or stabilized, another will take its place, with two or three crisis situations likely to prevail simultaneously.

G. The war in Vietnam will be resolved militarily or politically within the next five years, but regardless of the settlement US interests there and in Southeast Asia will continue exceptionally high.

H. Major changes in the alignment of certain, as yet unknown, nations will occur. Cuba and the Eastern European countries are susceptible to rapid change, and various Asian, African and Latin American countries could alter their orientation as a consequence of political upheaval.

2. Non-substantive

A. Crisis situations will increasingly require net, tactical, all-source reporting on a 24-hour basis. The executive and legislative branches will levy increasing demands on short notice for current intelligence support.

B. The Operations Center with special task forces as required will become a round the clock focal point in the Agency with on-duty representation and support from all Directorates as required.

C. Communications systems, local and world-wide, will be radically changed to provide rapid and secure transmissions of intelligence materials to and from OCI and the Operations Center. [?] | 86

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

- D. OCI will continue to have levied upon it by USIB a NIS production requirement roughly equivalent to present levels. OCI will continue to produce country handbook and problem-oriented research studies.
- E. Computer-type equipment will be increasingly used by OCI.

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

FIFTEEN YEAR INTELLIGENCE PLAN (1966-80)

II. OBJECTIVES

23 July 1965

NOTE: Our Objectives closely reflect those set by the Director of Central Intelligence in "Priority National Intelligence Objectives."

1. Substantive

A. Current Intelligence: To provide timely warning of developments that will directly or indirectly affect US security interests, and to summarize and provide running analytic commentary on these developments as they unfold, on the major areas of the world as follows:

(1) USSR: We consider that during the next five years at least, and probably through 1980, the most important intelligence objectives will be:

- a. To provide earliest prior warning of impending Soviet military attack on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is committed to defend.
- b. To detect major changes in the capabilities, posture and concepts for employment of Soviet general purpose and strategic military forces, particularly those with nuclear delivery capabilities, and development of new or significantly improved offensive or defensive weapon systems.
- c. To ascertain Soviet capabilities, intentions and efforts to initiate or support internal warfare in other countries.
- d. To anticipate critically important political, economic, and scientific and technical developments in the USSR; actual or potential conflicts within the Soviet hierarchy; major developments in Moscow's external policy.

SECRET

SECRET

(2) East European Satellites: We consider that the following will be the most important intelligence objectives:

- a. To discern major developments affecting trends toward nationalism and independence of Moscow; to ascertain actual or potential conflicts within the hierarchies of the several countries or conflicts among them; and to detect important economic, scientific and technical developments.
- b. To detect major changes in the capabilities, posture, and concepts for employment of the military forces of the Eastern European countries.

(3) Communist China and Asia Satellites: During the next fifteen years the most important intelligence objectives will be:

- a. To provide earliest prior warning of impending Chinese military attack on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is committed to defend.
- b. To detect major changes in the capabilities, posture, and concepts of employment of Chinese Communist general purpose and strategic military forces, with particular reference to development of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems and to development of new or significantly improved defensive weapon systems.
- c. To ascertain the extent to which the Chinese have achieved hegemony within the international Communist movement and the impact of this on the USSR, on the Communist bloc, and on Communist parties throughout the world.
- d. To assess Chinese Communist capabilities, intentions, and efforts to initiate or support internal warfare in other countries.
- e. To anticipate critically important political, economic, and scientific and technical developments in China; actual or potential conflicts within the ruling hierarchy; major developments in Chinese Communist external policy.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

(4) Vietnam: Until the war in Vietnam is settled, the major intelligence objectives will be:

- a. To report on the progress of the war.
- b. To ascertain Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to Vietnam and to US activities there.
- c. To provide earliest prior warning of impending Communist military actions with respect to Vietnam.
- d. To assess the stability and orientation of the South Vietnamese government and military forces.

(5) Cuba

- a. To determine changes in Cuban policy toward Free-World countries, in particular Cuban capabilities, intentions, and efforts to support insurgency or to take direct action against them.
- b. To determine the effect of fluctuations in the Cuban economy on the general stability of the regime.
- c. To determine the nature of Cuba's relations with the USSR, Communist China, and other Communist countries, including intentions to change the relationships.
- d. To determine changes in the Cuban military preparedness, particularly in terms of coping with internal resistance.


(6) Far East and Southeast Asia

- a. To assess the political and economic stability of the nations of the area and their orientation with particular reference to the US, and the Communist bloc; to anticipate the growth of any internal Communist subversive capabilities.

SECRET

SECRET

b. To assess rivalries, clashes, conflicts, and wars between, among, and within states of this area with a view to anticipating Communist exploitation of the situation.



25X6



d. To discern the pace and means by which Indonesia seeks to increase its influence in Southeast Asia at the expense of the West, with particular reference to cooperation with Communist China and the domestic influence of the Indonesia Communist Party.

(7) Middle East and South Asia

a. To assess the political and economic stability of all nations of this area and their orientation with reference to the US and the Communist bloc; to anticipate the growth of any internal Communist subversive capabilities.

b. To assess rivalries, clashes, conflicts, and wars between, among, and within states of this area with a view to anticipating Communist exploitation of the situation.

c. To anticipate major changes in the role of India, Pakistan, and Egypt in the global balance of power and to assess their attitudes and intentions toward other countries in the Asia-Africa area.

d. To ascertain military capabilities and policies with regard to development of modern weapons, including nuclear weapons, of   nations of the area.

25X6

e. To discern trends which might jeopardize Western access to petroleum resources of the area.

- 4 -
SECRET

SECRET

(8) Africa

- a. To assess the political and economic stability of the African independent nations, and their orientation with respect to the Communist Bloc and the US; the influence and presence of Communist nations through military and economic aid programs and diplomatic missions; and the development of any indigenous Communist capability for subversion.
- b. To assess rivalries, frictions, conflicts and wars that develop between, among, and within African nations, especially as opportunities are offered for Communist exploitation; to assess the development of regional fragmentation, particularly in the larger and more diverse countries, such as Congo (Leopoldville) and Nigeria.
- c. To appraise the developing clash between African nationalists and those areas still ruled by European powers or by local white minorities, with regard to its limiting US access to local minerals and facilities and causing friction between the US and Western European states, as well as for the situation's potential for Communist exploitation.

(9) Western Hemisphere

- a. To determine likelihood and consequences for the US of changes in governments in countries of Western Hemisphere.
- b. To determine the internal political stability conditions of countries in the Western Hemisphere, in particular the vulnerability to Communist-supported subversion, insurgency, and rebellion.
- c. To determine the policies and reactions of Western Hemisphere countries with respect to US diplomacy, foreign programs and activities.
- d. To determine the strength and cohesiveness of the OAS and other major organizations in the hemisphere.

- 5 -

SECRET

SECRET



2. Non-substantive: We seek to meet the increasing demands for rapid round-the-clock current intelligence support by:
- A. Providing a fully coordinated and expanded Operations Center adequately staffed and linked into Agency and Community operations. The Center should also be fully keyed into the Agency's and the Community's communications systems.
 - B. Developing stronger on-duty support by intelligence analysts on twenty-four hour a day basis, partly through task forces for crisis situations.
 - C. Providing a capability for rapid reproduction on twenty-four hour basis of all types of intelligence reports, briefings, and charts. Adequate review and editorial help also to be available.

SECRET

SECRET

- D. Providing an expanded twenty-four hour a day Registry, courier, and support systems.
- E. Supporting an Agency Congressional Situation Room within the next few years.
- F. Maintaining a team directly under the D/OCI to provide over-all support to the entire current intelligence effort.

- 7 -

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Next 30 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

PROBLEMS & PROTOCOLS

SECRET

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

FIFTEEN YEAR INTELLIGENCE PLAN (1966-80)

IV. MAJOR PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS

23 July 1965

The following problems and proposals should be considered. Some are directly related to the assumptions, objectives, and programs as outlined above; others derive from general problems in our operations.

A. Space

1. Problem: The space needs of the office will become acute in accordance with the personnel projections, especially those of the Operations Center and of the Sino-Soviet Bloc Staff. [REDACTED] by 1970 is indicated. DL

2. Proposal: To start planning now for the greater space needs, with a view to reducing the number of moves and adjustments in space needed in Headquarters building.

B. Personnel

1. Problem: To secure and retain the best qualified manpower to fulfill the increasing demands placed upon the office; to develop the skills and talents of the personnel to fulfill their duties with growing competence; to promote an atmosphere conducive to fresh thinking and new ideas. DP

2. Proposals: Within the context of career planning, to arrange for greater exchange and rotation of OCI personnel with other offices in the Agency engaged in related work, especially with a view to increasing the opportunity for overseas assignments; to raise the grade structure so as to encourage specialists to stay with the areas of their main experience and competence, and to stay with OCI; to consider adoption by the Agency of a 30-year retirement plan for all professional employees.


SECRET

SECRET

C. Research

1. Problem: To strengthen resources devoted to political research so that the effort can expand to meet foreseeable needs and to ensure that at times of high demands for top-priority spot analyses and studies, basic research does not suffer with respect to quality and deadlines.

2. Proposal: To review the Agency's political research effort with a view to the possibility of contracting out certain basic studies which are fairly



25X1

D. Cable Distribution

1. Problem: Distribution of field cables to analysts lags by many hours from receipt in Washington, frequently by hours behind desk officers in other agencies. The currency of the intelligence product suffers.

2. Proposal: To install automatic distribution of cables by means of a coding arrangement now employed in NSA. When originators include in the preamble of their messages the code, countless steps and man-hours can be saved by electrical routing and instantaneous print-out machines. Such an arrangement can be geared into automatic storage and retrieval system with a further saving of analysts' time.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

FIFTEEN YEAR INTELLIGENCE PLAN (1966-80)

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

23 July 1965

A. The Agency should increase its investigation of the potential for exploiting computers and other technical and scientific advances for the production of current intelligence. Only in this way, regardless of planned manpower increases, can we hope to maintain a capability of filling our mission by rapidly responding to regular and spot demands. The investigation should also consider the implications of such advances upon our personnel practices, with the possibility that we will soon need a considerably different "mix" of personnel than we now have, in terms of technical specialist versus generalist, or experienced area specialist versus junior traffic screener, for example.

B. The Agency should keep in its planning a high "flexibility ratio," to allow for rapidly shifting substantive priorities and unanticipated technical advances; in short, to be prepared to adjust rapidly when the unexpected happens.

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Next 35 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

SECRET


OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

FOREWORD

ORR's experience in economic research programming on a year-to-year basis has consistently demonstrated the importance of maintaining considerable program flexibility. Despite the close contact we have with customers and our long experience in anticipating their needs, many of the demands made on this Office over the course of a year are unpredictable. In most cases these are governed by changing world conditions, or crises. Because of this area of uncertainty, it is essential that we build up over time the kinds of files, basic research studies and experienced analysts which will give us the ability to meet the unforeseen demands that are certain to be imposed on us. This uncertainty, of course, also requires that the Agency maintain a responsive collection system which will enable us to fill in critical gaps as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that forward programming of research is essential, that the needs for broad areas of research concentration are definable with reasonable certainty, and that a large percentage of the anticipated consumer demand will actually materialize. However, there will be many requests for detailed reports and for aggregative studies as well that cannot be predicted and must be prepared from the shelf of basic research and from organized files of intelligence information.

A second limitation in preparing a forward program is the general lack of knowledge regarding the plans of other intelligence components whose activities affect both the work load and schedules of this Office. We are aware, for example, that plans exist for substantial improvement in the collection of various types of information and that the volume and quality of this information is likely to improve substantially over the next 15 years. However, the components of the Office responsible for preparing the individual elements of ORR's program have not been briefed on the likely intelligence yield of these new collection devices and are not able to take them properly into account. The same applies to future systems for the processing of the information acquired through either new or modified collection systems. We are not aware of the intended nature of the processing, the volume of information which will be delivered to us, and the extent to which this Office will be obliged itself to process certain of these materials. We recognize that in the first round of the current planning exercise each Office must prepare its report in isolation and that there will be subsequent modifications of the CIA plans as the inter-relationships among various components are understood and worked out.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Assumptions

Substantive -- General*

1. The principal antagonists of the US will be the USSR and Communist China.
2. Other Communist countries will be generally hostile to the US, and aligned, with varying degrees of firmness, either to the USSR or to Communist China.



25X6

4. Most other countries of the world -- especially the "underdeveloped" countries -- will be unstable to varying degrees in their domestic affairs and their international alignments. The attitudes and actions of even the weakest of these states may, according to circumstance, be of importance to US security.
5. Nuclear war, involving the US, will remain a possibility during the period of this Plan.
6. Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, wars of national liberation, and armed rebellions will occur from time to time in various areas. Most of these conflicts will involve US interests to some degree; some of them will threaten US security interests, some will involve US armed forces.

* The proposed assumptions prepared by ONE are acceptable to ORR with the addition of a number of points noted in the sections which follow.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Substantive -- Economic

7. Most of the IDC's will continue to embrace some form of "socialism" in political economy and these countries will continue to be unable to marshal the investment expenditures needed to achieve rapid economic growth.

8. The existence of disputes among communist countries on the appropriate Party philosophy of economic and military assistance to non-communist states will lead to increased efforts to develop or extend communist aid among the uncommitted countries.

9. The USSR continues to have a large and growing economy, with increasing ability to support foreign economic relations as well as modern military and space programs, but with mounting difficulties in economic organization and control.

10. Soviet Bloc-West tie: will be much stronger. Eusats will be part of a Greater Europe to much greater degree than today, with national Communist regimes acting in own best national interests. Manifold forms of cooperation will tie European economies closer together, and perhaps several Eastern European Communist countries -- Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia seem best bets -- will have official ties to such Western world organs as IMF, GATT, et al.


11. Intra-Soviet Bloc ties: will be correspondingly less important. Basic economic dependence on USSR will remain a fact of life for most Eastern European Communist countries, but growing rationalization of economic activity -- and concomitant improvement in their capacity to market goods in the West -- will give them more maneuverability in trade, and greater bargaining power in dealing with USSR. CEMA may still exist, but its chief function will be to represent Eastern Europe's interests in dealing with the EEC, EFTA, etc.

12. China: will, even in next few years, admit significant numbers of Western technicians, and will seek Western technology and capital goods much as USSR did in the 1920's and 1930's, with same end in view. China's trade ties with Eastern European Communist Countries will not diminish, and some technical experts from Eastern Europe will be accepted. Differences with USSR will not be reconciled, under any conditions short of general war, where they would be temporarily ignored; but, over fifteen years, polarization of world Communist movement into Moscow and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Peking spheres may settle into some uneasy equilibrium, with each Communist camp constantly consolidating its position and making unification of the movement ever less likely.



25X6

Substantive -- Military and Economic

14. Space: control of space will be a source of increasing tension between the US and USSR.

15. Nuclear: proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase significantly the danger of a nuclear conflagration.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Assumptions

Non-Substantive -- General

1. There will be an increasing demand by policy officials and by components of CIA for the product of CIA research both in those areas of CIA's primary responsibility under the NCID's and DCID's and those assigned as areas of primary responsibility to Defense and State.
2. Intelligence will experience an information explosion near the end of this decade which will be intensified during the 1970's. For many categories of intelligence this will bring not only a larger volume of information but marked improvements in its quality and its relevance to numerous priority targets. The volume of information which we anticipate will almost certainly exceed the capability for its effective processing and analysis under existing future programs.
3. A number of factors will severely limit the ability of the intelligence production offices to effectively analyze the rapidly growing volume of information and to meet the rising demand for intelligence analyses required by the policymakers and by various components of the Agency. These include: (a) the anticipated budgetary restraints on T/O levels; (b) the increasingly tight labor market for professional employees.
4. During the balance of this decade, Communist China will grow in importance as a priority intelligence target and, by the early or mid-1970's, will become a target roughly equal in importance to the Soviet Union. The relative lack of basic information on many priority targets in Communist China, the growing volume of intelligence information and the rising demand for intelligence reports over the 15-year period will require that substantially larger intelligence resources be directed toward study of this area.
5. There will be great improvements in computer capabilities which will not only enable the Agency and the Community to increase the number and complexity of computer applications but, because of their more simplified operations, a decentralized system will become more feasible.

SECRET


SECRET

Non-Substantive -- Economic

6. A continuation of the importance of short ad hoc "policy support papers" and the resultant pressure on the key area, division, and branch chiefs involved.
7. A continuation in US industry and government of the trend toward a shorter workday, workweek, and workyear with resultant effects peculiar to the efficiency of research operations.
8. An increase in the time and effort required for coordination in the Intelligence Community because of the greater complexity and subtlety of intelligence problems.

Non-Substantive -- Military

9. The Department of Defense will levy increasing requirements on intelligence for cost-effectiveness data and studies of foreign weapons systems and programs as inputs to studies used by the DOD in its decision making and long-range planning.
10. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) will require increased support in the field of military-economic intelligence



SECRET

25X1B

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Long Term Program

Objectives

Substantive

1. PNIO 1. Maximum prior warning of impending military attack on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is committed to defend.

Military research will relate the current deployment and operation of strategic offensive weapons systems and general purpose forces to this PNIO as will economic research on developments in logistic capabilities to deliver forces and supplies.

2. PNIO 2. Major changes in the capabilities, posture and concepts for employment of Soviet, Chinese Communist, and Cuban strategic military forces, with particular reference to Soviet nuclear delivery capabilities, Soviet development of new or significantly improved offensive or defensive weapon systems, and Chinese Communist development of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems.

The Military and Economic research areas jointly will continue to seek more effective measurement of the cost of advanced military programs in the Communist countries and the capabilities of these economies to support such programs.

3. PNIO 3. Major changes in the capabilities, posture and concepts for employment of the general purpose forces of Communist countries.

In addition to the major effort of the Military Research Area on this PNIO, economic research also will relate the general capabilities of these economies to the requirements for support of the activities of general purpose forces.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Long Term Program

Objectives

Substantive (continued)

4. PNIO 4. Soviet, Chinese Communist, North Vietnamese, North Korean, and Cuban capabilities, intentions, and efforts to initiate or support internal warfare in other countries.

In addition to military research relating military strength to capability to support warfare in other countries, economic research will relate general economic strengths and weaknesses of the Communist countries to capabilities for withstanding the resource drain inherent in supporting warfare in other countries.

5. PNIO 5. The Chinese Communist challenge to Soviet hegemony within the international Communist movement and the Soviet response thereto; the impact of this conflict on Sino-Soviet relations, on other interstate relations within the Communist Bloc, and on Communist parties throughout the world.

Military research will relate developments in Sino-Soviet differences to the possibilities for changes in military policies and doctrines; economic research will relate developments in Sino-Soviet differences to the possibilities for changes in plans for internal economic development.

6. PNIO 6. Critically important political, economic, and scientific and technical developments in Communist countries; actual or potential conflicts within the ruling groups; major developments in Soviet, Chinese Communist, North Vietnamese, and Cuban external policy.

25X1B

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Long Term Program

Objectives

Substantive (continued)

8. PNIO 8. Non-Bloc nuclear energy research and development, production of nuclear materials, and use of such materials for weapons and other purposes; non-Bloc development of guided missiles and other advanced weapons systems.

In addition to relating general economic developments to non-Bloc abilities in nuclear and missile research, development, and production, economic research on the non-Bloc countries will cover the economic situation and future economic prospects as they relate to problems of internal stability and foreign relations.

9. PNIO 9. The vulnerabilities of particular Latin American countries to subversion and to Communist political penetration.

Economic research will not only relate economic developments to this PNIO but in addition will cover the economic situation and future economic prospects as they relate to problems of internal stability and foreign relations.

10. PNIO 10. Important political development and trends in countries of Southeast Asia, their susceptibility to Communist political approaches and their vulnerability to internal subversion.

Economic research on these countries will relate prospects and problems of internal economic development to prospects for political stability.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Long Term Program

Objectives

Substantive (continued)

11. PNIO 11. The stability and orientation of Iran, Turkey, and the Arab states; the prospects for Arab unity; the prospects for inter-Arab or Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Economic research will relate internal economic developments to the likely course of political development in these countries and to the prospects for economic relations among countries of the area.

12. PNIO 12. The stability of the emergent states of Africa; their relations with one another and with the major powers; their vulnerability to Communist or radical African subversion; armed outbreaks, insurgency, or rebellion in the white-dominated areas of southern Africa.

Economic research will evaluate prospects for economic growth in the emergent states in light of changing political conditions and will assess the impact of participation by the US and the USSR in the development of these countries.

S-E-C-R-E-T

PROGRAMS

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Next 48 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

SECRET

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

MAJOR PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS


General

Acute Shortage of Technical and Professional Personnel

Over the next five years and beyond the Office of Research and Reports, as well as other major components of the Agency, will require substantially larger numbers of professional personnel, as well as personnel with considerably more training and experience. This is apparent from the pattern and volume of anticipated needs, the greater complexity of the problems we will be required to analyze, the fantastically large increase which we are expecting in the volume of useful information from a variety of sources, and the more sophisticated techniques which will be employed throughout the intelligence spectrum in collection, processing and analysis. These personnel needs will come at a time when our recruiters will be operating in an increasingly restricted and competitive labor market for professional personnel. During the 70's personnel attrition is likely to be higher because of more and more attractive opportunities on the outside and because of higher retirement rates arising from the same incentives, as well as for reasons of new retirement policies. CIA, to a great extent, has built its reputation on the minds and energies of a highly trained, experienced and dedicated staff. If we are to meet tomorrow's problems we must take advantage of the short lead-time which is still available to build up the kind of professional staff that will be required. There are a number of important steps which should be undertaken immediately if we are to avoid an acute shortage:

1. We should expand the number of professional recruiters in the Office of Personnel; we should expand the efforts of professional personnel in the production offices to participate in recruitment; we should increase the number of colleges and universities on our target list for recruitment; and, we should -- recognizing the intense competition for graduate students -- step up our efforts to employ undergraduates.

SECRET



SECRET

2. Faced with the certainty that our ability to employ graduate employees will be inadequate for our needs, we must budget substantial additional sums for Agency-sponsored training, primarily in courses outside of CIA. This should include particularly fulltime graduate programs for Agency employees; specialized industrial training as provided by American corporations and associations; training in various aspects of advanced weapons systems, etc. In addition, there is the great necessity for expanding or for developing the experience of Agency employees in overseas assignments. While members of the clandestine services and some employees in the DD/S continue to have on-the-ground experience abroad, an appallingly large percentage of employees, particularly in the lower and middle grades in the intelligence production offices of the DD/I have had little or no experience in the countries and areas on which they profess to be experts.

One category of training warrants special mention. There is general agreement that China is assuming rapidly increasing importance as an intelligence target and that, by the 1970's, China may well match the Soviet Union as an intelligence priority. It is very clear that, beginning now, there will be a major buildup in our intelligence collection and processing and analytical capabilities on all aspects of the China question. One of the most difficult talents to develop on this area is a working knowledge of the Chinese language. As the volume of Chinese publications increase, as new methods of collection acquire larger volumes of information in the Chinese language, we will require personnel with a facility in this language for a wide variety of activities. Given the long lead-time in this course of study, we must set programs in motion now.

25X1C

25X1B

SECRET

SECRET

25X1B

Need for Systems Analysis of Intelligence Programs

In attempting to develop a long-term program for the Office of Research and Reports and in listening to briefings involving the programs of other offices, it has become abundantly clear that CIA and the intelligence community require major new organizational arrangements for intelligence systems analysis. As programs are currently developed in the Agency they are geared primarily to particular functions and activities and are not related to other elements of the intelligence continuum. Some of the most careful and complex planning has related to the development of new hardware for intelligence collection, however, this programming often inadequately considers the processing and the analytic requirements for personnel, training and equipment -- requirements which must be matched with the time phasing of new collection devices and activities. Some form of systems analysis, some organized management technique, such as PERT or the Critical Path Method (CPM) should be applied to the intelligence process for major forward programs of the Agency and the community. This must involve, in any new program evaluation, a determination of the needs and ultimate objectives as determined jointly by those concerned with R&D, collection, processing and ultimate utilization in intelligence production. Too often this has not been the case. There, then, must be a consideration of the alternative means of achieving these objectives and some selection on a cost/effectiveness basis of the most attractive of these alternatives in terms of their cost/effectiveness at all stages of the intelligence process. The future demands on all of the intelligence activities associated with a new program cannot be predicted precisely for every

SECRET

SECRET

stage in the process but they can be defined in general terms and future requirements for personnel, training and equipment can be predicted in sufficient detail to provide the necessary lead-time for meeting the most critical future requirements. We are already in the middle of an information explosion which is providing a surfeit of certain kinds of information, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the same time the kind of information which would enable us not only to learn more of the intentions of other countries or, perhaps more important, would enable us to learn of the basic considerations which influence or will influence the policies and actions of these countries and the manner in which they are likely to carry out these policies is vastly deficient. Acquisition of this type of information involves inter alia the clandestine collection [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Despite the gross disproportions which presently exist in our efforts to acquire these different kinds of information, all of the evidence regarding present programs indicate that there will be infinitely greater distortion in this respect than presently exists. Given the feasibility of the various possibilities for intelligence collection, this may have the most logical approach, but there is no evidence that these decisions were based on careful and systematic consideration of the best alternatives.

Managing the Information Explosion

As indicated in the section above, dealing with the need for systems analysis, individual components of the Agency appear to be planning in isolation with inadequate regard for their relationship to other activities. In briefings before the Kirkpatrick Committee on several occasions we heard of major new programs for collection and processing of information which not only have had no impact on the planning of intelligence production programs but have not even penetrated the Agency's personnel programs. On the one hand, we were briefed on certain developments which will require large numbers of personnel over the next several years and on the other hand we heard the Office of Personnel say it is unlikely that the Agency's personnel ceilings will be raised significantly. There are elements of truth in both of these points, certainly the information explosion is already upon us and, even with the assignment of large numbers

SECRET

SECRET

of additional personnel to intelligence processing, this explosion may become unmanageable in future years. At the same time, the administration gives every evidence that Agency ceilings will not be lifted to any marked degree and, as a consequence, a potential effectiveness of future programs is likely to be snipped back by the two blades of these scissors. All of this is to argue that major efforts in time, money and talent must be devoted systematically for selecting out the wheat from the chaff at the earliest possible point in the intelligence process and, in so far as possible, it must be weeded out mechanically and by a very careful consideration of criteria which define the need of intelligence production offices and the ultimate consumer for collection of particular bits of information. A part of this solution rests with the employment of some form of systems analysis as described above.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1B

Military-Space

The Implications of Space Flight

In the planning documents we have seen, we believe that the potential but somewhat unpredictable impact on intelligence of another 15 years of exploration of outer space has not been sufficiently highlighted. Without stretching the imagination much, one can list a number of impressive space achievements likely to occur before 1980: manned US and Soviet lunar bases; manned orbiting space stations; soft landings of scientific instruments on the planets; advanced unmanned explorations beyond the solar system; increasingly sophisticated communications, reconnaissance and other satellite systems, possibly including orbital weapons and manned satellite inspection systems; and active space programs by a host of additional nations, including Communist China. It is much more difficult, however, to foresee with any precision the consequences of such achievements and the extent to which, in the long run, the pushing back of the space frontier will foster hostility or cooperation among nations.

SECRET

SECRET

The purpose of noting this as a potential major problem is not to create new science fiction enthusiasts but to emphasize that space flight is likely to affect world affairs -- and hence intelligence -- in a variety of far-reaching and perhaps sudden or unexpected ways. While it may not be appropriate or possible at this time to go beyond present plans and programs for intelligence collection, processing and production, we believe that intelligence should start thinking seriously and in the broadest possible terms about the implications of space well before the first man sets foot on the moon -- which will occur before the present Intelligence Plan is one-third completed.

SECRET

SECRET

Economic

ERA/ORR Research Could be Made More Predictive, More Interpretive

Through quantitative analysis, ERA research shows where stresses are occurring in foreign economies; what the limitations on growth will be; and what alternatives foreign governments face in allocating resources. With such analyses in hand, the policy-maker has one further question: what will the foreign government do? ERA has not made sufficient effort to answer this question, which calls for qualitative rather than quantitative analysis.

If we were asked to analyze our own economy, and to predict what the Administration's policy might be toward, say, foreign aid, we would begin perhaps by looking at aid as a share of GNP; but we would base our final judgment on a number of other factors . . . the public opinion polls on foreign aid, the Administration's majority in Congress, on whether the Party in power favored or opposed foreign aid, etc. The resulting analysis would be highly interpretive, and a meaningful guide to policy. Yet, when we analyze economic activity in other countries, ERA generally avoids precisely this sort of analysis. We thereby leave to others the sort of analysis that can provide a complete and useful guide for the policy-maker.

ERA analysts could soon start producing more comprehensive, more predictive analyses if they were explicitly required to consider economic policy questions concerned with their various fields of inquiry. The area branches, in particular, could lead the way in exploring such questions. Two changes would be required in the assignments given ERA analysts: first, they would be required to study and become familiar with the various sources which yield qualitative indicators in their areas of research -- e.g., new laws, official decrees, official or semi-official newspaper and journal articles, assignments and major public speeches of national leaders, etc.; second, they would be asked to make -- and to explain their basis for making -- predictions of future economic policy decisions.

The result would -- in time -- be an enhanced ability to provide meaningful guidance to the policy-making officials of our Government.

SECRET

SECRET

Development of Adequate Data Base

There will be a critical need for the development of an economic data base to be used in regular reporting and in more sophisticated economic analyses of the various non-Communist countries, particularly the Less Developed Countries. This data base would be made up of the principal economic aggregates for the several countries, accounts to reflect major external loans reflecting rate of expenditure and repayment schedules, and foreign trade and foreign financial transactions. These data should be developed from official sources to the maximum extent consistent with maintaining credible records. They should be reviewed and agreed to by analysts of Agencies participating in the data base program. The data should be recorded on magnetic tape to provide speed in recovery and maximum opportunity for analytical manipulation.

Inasmuch as economic data in this system would serve a wide range of users in the government, arrangements should be developed for a central repository. Commerce which is both an important user and the source of comparable data collection and processing for the US economy might undertake such a project, or State AID which would be a larger consumer of the proposed data base but which has much less experience in handling such a program.

The total annual cost of a program of collection, maintenance, and customer machine time should be around [] and would best be pro-rated among the users on the basis of demand for service. The CIA share of such a program would be no less than [] per year and might be as much as []

ERA/ORR Must be Flexible, Adaptable

To best serve the Chief Executive in a world subject to sudden change, ERA must be like a mobile defense force, able and ready to concentrate its activity with equal effectiveness wherever the Community needs expert economic intelligence analysis. This requires above all a truly professional elite; a cadre with comprehensive knowledge not only of economics, but of particular economic regions and their economic, political, and social structures, so that any aspect of a region's economic activity can be written about with authority.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Problems of Developing and Maintaining Highly Skilled Analysts

The technical demands on the individual professional in ERA will rise over the next 15 years; he will need more knowledge of industrial processes and complex military-related equipment (applies especially to professionals in the Resources and Industries Division, the Trade and Services Division, and the Military-Economic Research Area), more understanding of mathematics and economic theory (applies especially to professionals in the Analysis Division), and increasing understanding of new intelligence techniques [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Economic intelligence research should be conducted by a group large enough to provide opportunities for developing and maintaining the required degree of professionalism through exchange of information, on-the-job training of newcomers, mutual backstopping in case of illness or extended out-house training, and reserve capacity for emergency. The group must be large enough to provide flexibility in assignment, promotional opportunities, a balance of grizzled veterans and promising newcomers, and some insurance against the unholy rate of turnover. (These "economies of scale" are a major reason why research should be concentrated as far as possible in large units having "primary" if not "exclusive" jurisdiction over the subject matter; of course, a few brilliant individual outside scholars and one or two good "think factories" like RAND can make a contribution to the economic intelligence effort.)

Greater Use of Foreign Travel as Training Aid

Substantial increase in expenditure for foreign travel is needed to provide for an optimum training and development of economic analysts in the International Division. A well-planned study-travel tour of major areas on which an analyst works should be provided at approximately 5-year intervals to assure initially a first-hand comprehension of the physical and institutional milieu on which the analyst works and subsequently to observe and report on the visible impact of change on these areas. Access to such travel programs should be as early in the analysts experience as is consistent with a thorough understanding of the basic literature and regular analysis and reporting on the country concerned as well as achievement of career service designation in the Agency. Access to travel-study should be a function of assignment and preparation rather than grade-level and length of service. Under these circumstances travel will become a productive training operation which it should be if it is to be supported by the Agency.

~~SECRET~~


SECRET

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the final report of the Planning Group clearly indicate that many of the elements on which Agency programs are based -- such as world conditions, crisis situations, the demands of policymakers, and the volume and character of intelligence information -- are extremely unpredictable. It is therefore essential that Agency long-term programs be formulated in a way which will provide maximum flexibility in enabling us to respond quickly to unforeseen demands and future crises (see first paragraph of the Foreword).
2. That there be arrangements developed to ensure greater exchange of information among the various Agency and community components regarding individual long-term programs. While recognizing that there are security limitations, particularly with respect to the development of major new collection devices and future plans of the clandestine services, it is believed that it would be possible to extract sufficient information from all of the Agency's, and indeed the Community's, programs to ensure a more realistic framework for the forward programs of each of the major intelligence activities (e.g., down to division level in the DD/P and the office level in the DD/I). (See second paragraph of the Foreword.)
3. That the Office of Personnel, in close consultation with all of the Intelligence Directorates, work out a realistic long-term program for the recruitment and training of personnel which will take into account the considerations outlined on pages 1 to 3 in the section headed "Major Problems and Proposals."
4. That the Agency carefully study the need for a "captured" external research organization as discussed on pages 2 and 3 of the section headed "Major Problems and Proposals."
5. That the Agency establish a systems analysis staff, or a planning staff embracing this function, under the Executive Director - Comptroller, CIA (see pages 3 and 4 of the "Problems/Proposals" section).

SECRET



SECRET

6. That the systems analysis or planning staff (point 5, above) recognize at the outset that the problem of managing the information explosion is one of the two or three highest priority topics for its consideration.

25X1A

8. That the Economic Research Area of ORR be encouraged by the DD/I to undertake the kinds of predictive interpretive analysis discussed on pages 8 and 9 of the "Problems/Proposals" section.

9. That ORR be authorized by the DD/I to initiate discussions with the Department of Commerce and with State (including State/AID) to determine the feasibility of establishing a central computer-based file of economic information on the less developed countries (see page 9 of "Major Problems and Proposals.")

SECRET

SECRET


OFFICE OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE

Foreword

The thread of continuity woven through the programs contained herein is that reflecting an ever-increasing consumer demand for intelligence services. Concomitantly, there is an appropriate emphasis on ADP application to cartographic production, expedited processing, and improved storage and retrieval systems. Implicit in both, is the necessity for an Office so intimately involved in intelligence production and support to be colocated with those it serves.

Of particularly serious concern, also, is the manifest resurgence of unilateral departmental production of basic intelligence which could seriously dissipate the production capabilities of those agencies responsible for contributing to a more meaningful and authoritative interagency program.

SECRET



SECRET

OFFICE OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE

Assumptions

1. Substantive


(As stated by ONE with these additions)

- a. Countries bordering on or with interests in the Arctic will work toward a detente or some sort of Antarctic-type treaty covering the North Polar region.
- b. An increased number of "denied areas" will develop around the world as an outgrowth of the increase in number of insecure countries.
- c. Arms control, inspection, and nuclear disarmament will become recurring issues as more nations join the nuclear club.
- d. The moon and possibly certain planets will by the end of the planning period become active targets for intelligence collection, collation, and reporting.
- e. The ocean areas of the world, on the surface as well as beneath, will become of major importance to the Free World in the struggle for control of the resources of the world.

2. Non-Substantive

- a. Requirements for basic intelligence will not only increase but become increasingly detailed and demand more analytical precision as data continue to improve and end users become more diverse.

SECRET



SECRET

b. Intelligence collection, storage, and retrieval systems will continue to improve faster than analytic resources.

c. There will be an increasing necessity for close coordination of military- and civilian-agency intelligence programs.

d. There will be a continued increase in demand for maps and related data on all areas and subjects, with increased emphasis on greater detail and more evaluation, as the scope of intelligence activities broadens with a concomitant increased emphasis on more rapid response time for the collection, processing, and retrieval functions.

e. Automated mapping systems will result in proliferation of map products, i.e., quantities, types, and coverage, that will require increased collection, processing, storage, and retrieval capabilities.

--

g. There will be a demand for a map bibliography input for Project CHIVE. CHIVE customers will receive a map reference printout as part of the total system output. It is expected that demands for map dissemination and reference assistance will be increased thereby.

h. Maps and related information will play an increasingly important role in the most economic and technically feasible exploitation of the products of new exotic collection devices. (Location, verification, display of interpreted data.)

i. There will be an increased demand for a production of maps and charts of space and celestial bodies, and ocean floors and environmental conditions of water bodies.

SECRET

SECRET

j. Programmed basic and environmental intelligence will provide a basis for collection and production to serve as a foundation for current intelligence, estimates, etc.

k. Technological advances in reproduction will facilitate more frequent NIS maintenance.

SECRET

SECRET


OFFICE OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE

Objectives

1. Substantive

- a. Determine Bloc and Free World research, development, production, and deployment of advanced weapons and weapons systems.
- b. Determine the military/economic capability of the Communist nations individually or collectively to support a general war.
- c. Determine the intentions and capabilities of Communist countries to initiate and support insurgency, rebellion, and anti-regime activities in other countries.
- d. Determine the strength, deployment, capabilities, and tactics of Communist-initiated or-supported groups engaged in insurgency and rebellion.
- e. Determine the causes and probable results of friction within the Communist Bloc, the Free World, and between Bloc and Free World countries.
- f. Determine the internal political stability and military and economic strength and weaknesses of non-Bloc countries where Communism and other anti-US activities and ideas are now or may be significant.
- g. Determine Bloc and Free World intentions and capabilities with respect to moon and, possibly, planetary exploration.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

h. Determine environmental conditions that may affect military, paramilitary, and intelligence collection operations in foreign areas.

2. Non-Substantive

a. Implement the responsibilities of the DCI for basic intelligence under NSCID No. 3 with respect to the NIS Program, geographic research, and cartographic and map reference services.

b. Provide guidance and direction to all production of basic intelligence in the Community in order to achieve a more coherent response to basic intelligence requirements and reduce unnecessary duplication of research effort by providing a locus of authority in fulfillment of the Agency's coordination role in the intelligence community.

c. Develop a program of systematic collection of environmental data on foreign areas in support of basic intelligence needs.

d. Improve utilization of behavioral-science knowledge and techniques in intelligence research and analysis.

e. Achieve agreed Community principles and policies on the use of external facilities for intelligence research.

f. Strengthen existing support relationships between organizations concerned with intelligence production and those concerned with intelligence operations.

g. Coordinate and support production of, as well as review and edit contributions to, the National Intelligence Surveys and arrange and direct the publication of such surveys.

h. Increase NIS responsiveness to specific basic intelligence needs of the U. S. Government in terms of timeliness and comprehensiveness.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

i. Utilize technical advances in high-speed printing with the use of computers, scanners, and similar equipment for publication of the NIS and other basic intelligence in order to expeditiously service the consumer.

j. Support the central authority (BGN) for the standardized spelling of geographic place names on a worldwide basis for the purpose of eliminating duplication in such activity in the Government.

k. Provide maps and graphics for intelligence production, policy planning, and operations in the Agency, Department of State, and other agencies as appropriate.

l. Stimulate within the Government a fuller utilization of maps and related information through the dissemination of bibliographies and research aids and by briefings and displays.

m. Develop and implement a fully automated map storage and retrieval system as part of the overall emphasis and requirement for expedited information processing.



25X1

o. Develop a stronger role in recommending inter-Agency special subject and topographic map production to meet basic intelligence needs, priority intelligence requirements, and coverage deficiencies.

p. Stimulate, exploit, and selectively sponsor resource development and resource inventory mapping for input and utilization in a basic intelligence data store.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

25X1



r. Develop a "central intelligence" map library facility through the use of film miniaturization and ADP techniques to insure rapid and comprehensive service to customers of all map materials available throughout the Government.

s. Develop a map evaluation capability to support research and production efforts to more efficiently serve Community interests.

t. Establish a basic information center to consolidate holdings of maps, guides, atlases, gazetteers, and related basic geographic and environmental intelligence, with direct ties and service capabilities with larger and more diverse data centers, e.g., CHIVE.

u. Develop the full potential of automation as applied to the compilation, drafting and reproduction phases of cartography to more fully meet the ever-increasing consumer requirements.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Next 92 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

SECRET


OFFICE OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE

Major Problems and Proposals

The production mechanism for basic environmental research in the Intelligence Community should be reviewed with the objective of achieving a more meaningful and coordinated program which would lessen undesirable duplication and the diffusion of research effort. What appears to be required is the highest level management support in the legitimate exercise of the Agency's coordination role in this regard, with the Office of Basic Intelligence assuming the major role in the coordination of basic intelligence in the Community. To avoid unnecessary duplication of research effort, recognition must be given to the National Intelligence Surveys and such other special studies produced by OBI as the principal means of satisfying the Government's basic intelligence requirements. Timely NIS -- given greater flexibility in production planning -- and other basic studies tailored to specific national intelligence requirements -- are capable of providing better, more uniform environmental intelligence at an overall saving to the Intelligence Community. Consideration might be given to the establishment of a Basic Intelligence Committee of USIB. In any case, the most appropriate way of achieving our basic intelligence research objectives and resolving the two major problems of fragmentation and duplication appears to lie in a Community-wide coordinated approach to both the existing NIS Program and supplementary problem-oriented research studies undertaken under central authority.

25X1

SECRET



SECRET

25X1



It is generally understood that greater sophistication must be shown by the Intelligence Community in the analysis of problems bearing on the fields of anthropology, socio-psychology, and related fields. The Geography Division intends to increase attention to these subjects in their regional environmental settings in two ways. First, we intend to study and maintain research surveillance on ethnic sources of social and political stress and overt dissidence. There is insufficient coverage of this subject at present and it will be an important need in both Communist and non-Communist areas. Second, and consistent with the above, we hope to broaden our staffing with a few young specialists in these fields who also have backgrounds in geography.

The long-term focus of geography in intelligence will be essentially unchanged in terms of end users. We expect it to change considerably, however, in the amount and nature of detail required in research results, and in the numbers of priority requirements generated by U.S. security involvements overseas. The following list outlines important program developments that we anticipate which are not brought out by the Program statements in Section III:



25X1

SECRET

25X1

international developments. In general, as any nation increasingly acquires the characteristics of a "denied area", the potential need for such systematic intelligence mapping of that area increases.

There is little question but that there will be a steady, perhaps even dramatic, increase in demands for more rapid and comprehensive map reference services from the Map Library. This increase will derive from both the inherent demands on intelligence and an increased awareness and sophistication that is already noticeably developing in the expanding group of map users. We are recommending two basic steps that will be necessary to tool up to meet future demands: 1) the modest increases over the years in personnel; 2) full utilization of existing and future EAM and ADP techniques and hardware, including R&D in some technical areas, e.g., color reproduction, that do not seem to be receiving such attention in the common market.

With an anticipated increase in demands for basic intelligence, i.e., geographic and environmental data, as input for broader research and operational problems in the Community, far greater attention must be given to unique problems associated with the integrated handling of such data in a multitude of formats, e.g., conventional maps, orthophoto maps,

25X1

collection of maps and related geographic intelligence must keep pace with the demands for quality products based on this type of data. The expected increase in map production by DoD agencies within 5 years will strain the capacity of the Map Library for the physical handling of such bulk. Miniaturization of this data, with associated automated storage, retrieval, reproduction, and bibliographic control, seems to offer the only solution.

SECRET

Automatic data processing opens a new area of potential improvement in efficiency in the field of cartography. The art of map production will go through radical changes in the next 15 years; changes brought about by the machine ability to store and recall the bits and pieces of information necessary to depict a portion of the earth's surface in a graphic manner. ADP will not only promote the development of greater data accuracy, but, by eliminating repetitive processes, it also will enlarge the capability to produce more per unit of manpower in a shorter period of time. The problem of Management to adjust to the potential of ADP will be great. Continued emphasis on training programs to develop greater competence in research techniques and graphic presentation will be promoted to improve the effectiveness of thematic maps and graphics.

With regard to the publication process, ADP systems are now available that allow the analyst to feed material directly into the computer and to get printouts on a code command to the computer. Scanners are also available that will eliminate the need for the time-consuming proofreading. Project EPIC (Electronic Printing for Intelligence Composition) as now planned will provide the base for a much broader program which will allow for updating of all or parts of intelligence studies in a minimum of time by bypassing many of the present time-consuming operations. These systems will require new equipment and trained personnel to operate them. In order to meet our objectives, we must accelerate our pace in the ADP field by 1) converting to high-speed phototype setting equipment, 2) eliminating the costly time-consuming operation of typed-drafts of reports by using high-speed, tape-producing equipment that has quick and efficient tape correction capability, and 3) use of scanners which would reduce the need for the present slow method of proofreading. To implement this program will require extensive coordination with, and support by, all organizations concerned with intelligence production.

Long-range planning linking technical collection to intelligence production has been deficient. The development of various devices of intelligence collection has progressed at an accelerated rate with apparent unlimited funds and ready access to required personnel. On the other hand, the users of the information collected have, under stringent economy measures, been forced to give up personnel strength while being pressed to continue with improved quality and quantity of finished intelligence.

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

23 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI Planning Group

SUBJECT: Fifteen Year Intelligence Plan

1. The Office of Central Reference has had under way since 1963 in its Project CHIVE a long range program to obtain maximum benefit from the introduction of computers in information handling. CHIVE at the present time is just entering a phase of intensive preparation for the inauguration of a first operating component, looking to full conversion of OCR document retrieval and selected information services by 1970.

2. OCR's fifteen year plan projects accordingly a radical alteration of its existing structure and services. Under the circumstances we anticipate that our planning assumptions and objectives will stand up in reasonably firm fashion but that numerous modifications will occur through time in the projections of the Office organization and allocation of resources. It will also be essential that these OCR projections be reviewed immediately to take account of the program planning of our customer offices. Such integration of our support role with the analytical and operational plans of other Agency components has not been possible during this first phase of the Agency's planning effort.

3. We have discussed in detail at appropriate points in the OCR plan and would emphasize here once again that OCR's projection of the role of central information services in intelligence reflects, and to some extent leads the way, in the revolution now occurring in the country in the management of information. There are three facets of our projection to which we invite your particular attention:

SECRET

- 2 -

- a) user involvement
- b) appreciation of the state of the art in information technology
- c) management of information services based on new tools developing in systems analysis and operations research.

4. User involvement: One judgment on our part is that communication has been inadequate in determining the bounds between OCR and customer offices as to what information services shall be provided centrally and what services shall be provided within the component, and, particularly by the intelligence officer out of personally maintained files. We believe that Project CHIVE already provides for more meaningful communication but that many further gains can be realized through user education and increased user involvement in CHIVE planning.

5. State of the art in information technology: The first 18 years of Central Reference operations have seen major advances in information management through applications of microphotography, copy equipment, and exploitation of punched card techniques. Project CHIVE now points the way to the next generation of central reference technology through the application of computers, remote query, display and print-out capabilities, data links between information systems, and machine assisted translation. Closely linked to the preceding subject of user involvement is the development now under test in many public and private organizations of user controlled information storage and processing programs within the computer.

6. Management of information services: Major advances have already occurred in industry and military programming for example in activity measurement, scheduling and cost/benefit analysis using computer based analytical systems. Such concepts are being incorporated in the CHIVE plan simultaneously with the management information systems under development at various other locations in the Agency. The integration of these efforts in support of overall Agency and community planning is certain to be far advanced in the course of the next fifteen years.

7. Having noted the above areas of information handling in which genuine progress is now clearly in prospect, it is also essential that all planners maintain a realistic appreciation of the intellectual art of information storage and retrieval. All information processing is concerned with the establishment

- 3 -

of "handles" or "clues" in the forms of named objects, subject headings, codes denoting logical classes, abstracts, and so forth, any or all of which "clues" are designed to assist the searcher in recovering an author's entire treatment of a subject in an intelligence report, finished study, book, or newspaper article. Any "clue" established with the most rigid logic and perspicacity today can never substitute for the complete text, or capture tomorrow's usage of the particular terminology. Any concept of information retrieval starts therefore with the premise of search, and search strategy and technique no matter how educated denotes this basic human inability to anticipate the future. Much can be done to organize and facilitate the search. Employment of punched cards and computers have indeed already revolutionized the capabilities of earlier generations. In the final analysis, however, these central information services can never substitute for the intellectual effort of the trained substantive intelligence officer.

25X1A



JOHN K. VANCE
Director of Central Reference

Attachments

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

I. 2. Non-Substantive Assumptions


- a. Central reference activities will play an increasingly large role in support of intelligence collection, analysis and production.
- b. OCR will continue its predominant role in information retrieval for intelligence and will continue to support USIB agencies.
- c. Technical intelligence collection will expand through "break-throughs" resulting in a heavy increase in special-source reporting.
- d. The flow of incoming intelligence reports requiring processing for document and information retrieval purposes will increase by about 20% to one million documents a year by 1970 and will reach 1 1/2 million a year by 1980.
- e. The flow of open literature required for intelligence purposes will increase by 5% a year.
- f. The flow of photography from television and motion pictures will greatly increase.
- g. Response times of minutes will be required for document and information retrieval.
- h. OCR will have to use electronic data processing equipment to the maximum of its capability.
- i. Fully automated document storage systems linked to EDP equipment will be required.



25X1

- 2 -

25X1

- 
- l. New communications equipment will provide for easier, faster and secure transmission of large data volumes allowing for direct EDP inputs and outputs.
 - m. Large training and retraining programs will be required in conjunction with conversion to EDP and other automation.
 - n. There will be increased liaison with both USIB and non-USIB agencies in order to utilize to the maximum their information systems.
 - o. Foreign publications will continue to be a prime source for intelligence production.


OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

II. 2. Non-Substantive Objectives

- a. Process all incoming documents for title control to the computer within 4 hours of receipt.
- b. Process all documents to file storage, either microimage or hard copy, within 4 hours of receipt.
- c. Answer priority information requests within 30 minutes by 1970 and within 10 minutes by 1980.
- d. Answer routine information requests within 4 hours by 1970 and within 2 hours by 1980.
- e. Deliver a copy of any document in 10 minutes.
- f. Provide remote request and delivery points, for documents and information (automated as appropriate).
- g. Answer information requests on an integrated all-source basis as required.
- h. Maintain a complete current and historical file of all intelligence documents produced in or received by CIA.
- i. Produce new and rapid search indexes for consumer "current awareness" and reference purposes.
- j. Tie-in with other appropriate machine systems in and outside government to reduce processing time and costs.
- k. Augment the CHIVE document index mode by the inclusion of books and periodical literature in the Library.

- 2 -

- 1. Utilize the most direct channels for procurement of foreign publications whenever feasible.
- m. Test and explore systems of automation that will increase further the speed and efficiency of Office activities.
- n. Acquire direct line tie-in for receipt of commercial wire-photos.
- o. Develop, test and put in operation an EDP-backed all-source document and information retrieval system.
- p. Acquire a fully automated computer-linked document delivery system.
- q. Develop and operate a Central Reference Computer Center.
- r. Test the Automatic Language Processing (ALP) system for machine-aided translation and stenotype production.
- s. Develop a fully competent systems analysis group and programming group.
- t. Exploit foreign publications specifically and exhaustively for photography and descriptive data in support of NPIC. This would be in addition to present efforts on behalf of other components of the Agency and the Community.
- u. Phase out the present heterogeneous and overlapping specialized registers and indexing activities and merge into one all-source system.



25X1

- 3 -

- w. Continue dissemination of all incoming collateral and codeword documents to Agency offices and CIA-produced reports to the intelligence community.



25X1

- y. Continue to acquire and process motion pictures, videotape and ground photography to meet Agency needs.
- z. Continue maintenance of a CIA Library for reference support to the Agency.
- zz. Continue to provide linguistic services required by Agency components.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

Next 28 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100110001-6

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

IV. Major Problems and Proposals

- a. New role for information processing: the continually increasing military and technical developments and periodic political shifts in established nations and the nationalistic and communistic pressures in emerging countries, resulting in an all-source collection activity which floods recipients, requires that information processing (IP) be viewed today as a key element in the intelligence cycle - unlike its low hierarchical position of the past. This means not only management-backing in terms of equal status with respect to slotting, competitive salary levels and expensive equipment, but a direct role in both collection management (to ensure exploitation of the existing store of knowledge) and intelligence production (as a team member in production planning). Analysts must have a more direct connection with IP in selection and purging of stored data; validated requirements must control the reporting flood at its source; and communications developments must occur in consonance with planning for more automatic handling of transmitted data.
- b. Education: The ADP-backed IP world requires not only highly trained computer programmers and systems designers, but also a new breed of information analyst; a more knowledgeable customer (also trained in computer files, query language and other general ADP capabilities and limitations); and trained management, utilizing information systems knowledge to ensure maximum use of ADP in making mission accomplishment and cost/effectiveness judgments across Agency lines. Informed policy guidance, to permit evolutionary development from (a) improvement of existing but separate Agency systems - through (b) integration by compatible developments involving the separate CIA systems - to a (c) compatible Community information network, is required to keep in perspective the logical-sounding but seductive arguments for ADP standardization among agencies at what, today, is a premature time. Likewise much greater management familiarization with ADP is required to resolve such

SECRET

- 2 -

basic issues as ADP centralization vs. decentralization and to keep ADP in its proper support, rather than, a policy determining position.

- c. Research and Development: Although hardware has progressed astonishingly, great work remains in the software field to take full advantage of the prodigious speed and storage capacity of the central unit: work in automatic input, compiler programs, new program languages, faster printers, analog-to-digital conversion, automatic language processing systems (not just machine translation but automatic indexing, abstracting, associating, etc.). And most difficult to break-through is the state-of-the-art in indexing of concepts and subjects as compared with targets, people, things; the major aim here is to improve the relevance of that which is recalled from an IP system, the present level of the indexing art showing an inverse ratio between relevance/recall in any system developed.
- d. Security: Since IP has been understressed, security policy concerning document/information control procedures has often been uninformed and has erred on the side of unnecessary and unrealistic restrictiveness. Logging and receipting costs (manpower/time) are staggering in a central facility receiving one million documents (in multiple copies) per year and retrieving several times that number in response to requests. The only truly effective security is personnel security, hence (granted the need, always, for certain kinds of compartmentation) there must develop an operationally feasible security policy and machine-backed capability to provide for cross-source correlations; reduction of time-consuming collateral-only requests and production by non-SI cleared people when relevant special source materials exist; access to segments of all-source files and research aids by non-SI cleared people when collateral-only information is required; and physical controls (open-shelf filing, more secure areas, etc.) to conserve precious building space and reduce thousands of manhours in simply opening and closing central reference collection safes.
- e. Liaison/Coordination: Related to Problem b. above is the need for a single Agency face for the mushrooming inter-Agency committees, panels, BoB task forces, and study groups

- 3 -

concerned with ADP-backed information processing systems, most of which do not have the experience with man-machine activities of the scope and complexity of our central reference office, and whose zeal has been and may continue to be more counter-productive than helpful. Again, it's a matter of education and timing. And again, the "face" ought to be that of a system manager rather than an ADP specialist to keep the proper balance between, and hierarchical positions of, operational responsibility and the support tools used.

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

V. Recommendations

- a. That Agency (not single directorate) backing be given Project CHIVE, the current system design for an ADP-backed central reference facility, as the activity with greatest potential for effective information/document control in-house and as a model for the future Intelligence Community information network;
- b. That information management (substantive and business type) receive much greater attention, including formal ADP and operations research training, to better assess and plan total Agency programs, with considerably greater awareness of the effectiveness of individual directorate's activities as a part of the whole;
- c. That recruitment/wage and classification policy and standards be established that
a) recognize that quality in information processing costs money and b) perpetuate the sense of urgency and vibrancy which promote high performance and counter the tendency toward old-line bureaucracy;
- d. That much greater attention be given to the development of a cadre of informed intelligence officers who can act as teams to handle several crises at once, which teams would include, in all cases, an information specialist;
- e. That security policy be developed which affords protection based on the individual as the keystone, which permits all-source support, and which is dynamic and flexible, growing with the times;
- f. That communication with others on information processing within CIA and with outside agencies, however supported by machines and people, continue to be the responsibility of the Director/Central Reference with solid backing from the Office of the Director.